A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law by Greabe, John M.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2008
A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law
John M. Greabe
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greabe, John M., "A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law" (2008). Constitutional Commentary. 543.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/543
Articles 
A BETTER PATH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
TORT LAW 
John M. Greabe* 
Author's Note: The Supreme Court issued an opinion in Pearson 
v. Callahan -a case I discuss in this paper- just as the paper was about 
to go to press. In Pearson, a unanimous Court reached the result for 
which I argue on narrower grounds than I propose. The Pearson deci-
sion does not affect the arguments I present in the paper. 
There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of constitu-
tional tort law. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly said that the federal statute under which most constitutional 
tort claims are brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 is not substantive; it 
merely channels positive law rights created elsewhere, primarily 
in the Constitution.2 But on the other hand, the doctrinal regime 
the Court has created under section 1983 (as well as the parallel 
regime authorized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotici) avoids difficult governmental im-
* Associate Professor of Law. Vermont Law School. The author would like to 
thank Seth Aframe. Lowell Brickman. Alan Chen. Erin Curley. Bruce Duthu. Jackie 
Gardina. Judge Jeffrey Howard. Heidi Kitrosser. Gil Kujovich. Ed Kulschinsky. Ken 
Sansone. Ryan Searle. Judge Norman Stahl. and Ernie Young for their excellent com-
ments and suggestions. 
1. In pertinent part. 42 U .S.C. § 1983 states: 
Every person who. under color of any statute. ordinance. regulation. custom. or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia. subjects. or causes 
to be subjected. any citizen of the United States or other person within the ju-
risdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights. privileges. or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws. shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law. suit in equity. or other proper proceeding for redress .... 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2000). 
2. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). To simplify. I will limit my references to section 1983 
throughout this paper. But readers should construe my arguments also to apply to the 
Supreme Court's parallel Bivens jurisprudence. 
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munity issues by requiring that nearly all claims for damages 
formally be brought against personal defendants in their individ-
ual capacities.~ The fact that nearly all damages claims under sec-
tion 1983 are brought as individual-capacity actions cannot be 
squared with characterizing section 1983 as non-substantive. 
Outside of the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery or in-
voluntary servitude, the Constitution does not impose limits on 
individuals as individuals-i.e. as private jural persons separate 
and distinct f~om the government whose power they are said to 
have abused.' Thus, personal defendants cannot "violate" the 
Constitution in their individual capacities, and a section 1983 
plaintiffs right to claim against a personal defendant in an indi-
vidual capacity cannot arise directly from the Constitution. And 
this leaves only one other potential source of this important sub-
stantive right: section 1983. 
This paper seeks to explain how recognizing the substance 
of section 1983 insofar as it authorizes individual-capacity claims 
could pave the way for a clarifying reform of the quagmire that is 
constitutional tort doctrine." Part I starts with an elaboration of 
why section 1983 is substantive and an explanation of why an in-
dividual-capacity claim, while containing an imbedded constitu-
tional issue, is not itself truly "constitutional. "7 Part I then dis-
cusses some implications of these observations for a problem 
that the Supreme Court is poised to revisit when it decides Pear-
son v. Callahan later this term: the wisdom and legality of the 
order-of-decisionmaking rule prescribed in Saucier v. Katz.s The 
Saucier rule directs that, in individual-capacity actions in which 
the defendant asserts a qualified immunity from damages liabil-
ity because the challenged conduct was not obviously unlawful," 
courts should enable the ongoing development of constitutional 
law by deciding whether the defendant's conduct caused a con-
stitutional deprivation before proceeding to decide whether the 
defendant is entitled to immunity. 10 
4. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
6. For why constitutional tort doctrine is a quagmire. see infra note 49 & notes 58-
88 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
8. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). receded by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). In 
Pearson v. Callahan. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). the Supreme Court issued an order granting a 
writ of certiorari and directing the parties to brief "[w]hether the Court's decision in 
[Saucier] should be overruled." 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008). 
9. See infra note 30. 
10. 533 U.S. at 201. 
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Part I concludes with an argument that the Saucier rule, 
which was imposed because of concerns about the ·'freezing" of 
constitutional law/' should be relaxed and modified to take ac-
count of the fact that binding constitutional rulings should not be 
made in statutory claims against individuals as individuals-
claims to which the government is not formally even a party.'' In 
those cases where the law-development concerns underlying 
Saucier lead a court to conclude that it should address the consti-
tutional issue that is imbedded within an individual-capacity 
claim, the government should first be invited to intervene and to 
brief its position on the constitutionality of the conduct that the 
lawsuit has put into issue. L' 
Part II turns to a larger doctrinal consequence of the erro-
neous assumption that section 1983 is non-substantive: the 
emergence over the past 40 years of the non-textual affirmative 
immunity defenses that the Supreme Court has read into the 
statute and made available to individual-capacity defendants.'~ 
Part II argues that, once one appreciates that section 1983 is sub-
stantive insofar as it authorizes individual-capacity claims, the 
door opens to important questions that the Court has not asked: 
Is there really any reason to read a conflict of laws into individ-
ual-capacity claims under section 1983. as the Court has done in 
creating these affirmative immunity defenses? More specifically. 
11. See id.: see also infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. This argument modifies my prior 
position. which was that courts should be sensitive to law-freezing concerns and address 
the imbedded constitutional issue unless case-specific reasons counsel against doing so. 
See also John M. Greabe. Mirabile Dictum': The Case for ··unnecessary·· Conslillllional 
Rulings in Ch·il Rigllls Damages ACiions. 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403. 426-37 (1999). 
My prior position took as a given the foundational proposition that this paper criticizes: 
that the threshold question in an individual-capacity damages claim is itself --constitu-
tional."" 
By requiring that courts always address the constitutional issue that is imbedded 
within the threshold statutory question presented in an individual-capacity claim. Saucier 
went beyond the ··presumptive(]"" approach for which I argued and adopted an unduly 
inflexible approach. See id. at 437 (describing situations where bypassing the constitu-
tional issue is .. the wiser jurisprudential course .. ). For this additional reason. I would like 
to see the Court relax the Saucier mandate when it decides Pearson v. Callahan. And vet. 
the Court should continue to emphasize the costs of law-freezing and chart a cours~ by 
which courts entertaining individual-capacity claims in which it is important to settle the 
law may solicit government intervention and then legitimately address the imbedded 
constitutional issue. Below. I argue that the Court might look to and borrow from the 
procedures specified in FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1 and FED. R. APP. P. 44. which mandate notice 
to the government and an opportunity to intervene in cases where privatt! parties chal-
lenge the constitutionality of statutes and the government is not a named party. See infra 
note 47 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 77-7H and accompanying text. 
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is there really any reason to treat the substantive entitlements to 
sue individuals that section 1983 creates as coextensive with true 
constitutional rights but subject to being trumped by affirmative 
immunity defenses, drawn from the common law. that the stat-
ute does not authorize? And is there anything worthwhile ac-
complished by this giving-with-the-one-hand-while-taking-with-
the-other construction of the statute, which often results in a sec-
tion 1983 plaintiff being told that a remedy is being withheld 
even though there has been a rights-violation? 
Part II contends that the answer to each question is no. 
Constitutional tort litigation would be far better off if the Su-
preme Court reinterpreted section 1983 to avoid this conflict be-
tween statutory text and common law (which it has inexplicably 
resolved in favor of the common-law rule!), eliminated all af-
firmative immunity defenses. and instead construed the entitle-
ments to sue individuals that section 1983 authorizes as narrower 
than the true constitutional rights that limit government enti-
ties. 1' Such a reading, which is rooted in existing Court prece-
dent.1" would do far less violence to the text of the statute than 
that inflicted by current doctrine. 17 Moreover, narrowing the sub-
stantive reach of the statute could help to promote the early 
resolution of groundless damages claims at the pleading stage, 
minimize costly disagreements over issues peripheral to liability, 
and preserve the substantive rights and procedural protections 
that parties to section 1983 actions presently enjoy- all within a 
litigation framework that is built on ground rules familiar to 
judges and practitioners, and therefore less likely to cause un-
necessary confusion or to invite lawless judicial tinkering.1H Fi-
nally, the proposed reform would help to clarify that, whatever 
else might be said of it, the limited damages-liability regime au-
thorized by section 1983 involves no disregard of Chief Justice 
Marshall's promise of a remedy for every invasion of a constitu-
tional right,1y as many commentators have charged. 2° For it would 
drive home the point that an individual-capacity damages action 
15. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 58-78 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 105-114 and accompanying text. 
19. Marburv v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. 163 (1803) ("The government of 
the United State~ has been emphatically termed a government of laws. and not of men. It 
will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation. if the laws furnish no remedy for the 
violation of·a vested legal right."). 
20. See Greabe. supra note 13. at 404-05 & n.11 (collecting a representative sam-
pling of such criticisms). 
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is merely a unique statutory tort claim that Congress has author-
ized against some personal defendants involved in constitutional 
violations, and that it is cumulative of any direct remedy the 
plaintiff might have against the government agency which actu-
ally committed the constitutional violation.21 
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF SECTION 1983 AND THE 
FALSE PREMISE OF SAUCIER 
The Supreme Court appears to have taken the non-
substantive nature of section 1983 as a given.22 But at the same 
time, the Court has avoided the potentially difficult immunity 
problems that would be raised in suits for damages brought di-
rectly against government entities by requiring that nearly all 
claims for damages under section 1983 be filed as individual-
capacity claims against the personal defendants who have acted 
under color of law during the incident underlying the lawsuit.23 
21. For an interesting discussion of what remedies might be constitutionally re-
quired for invasions of constitutional rights. see John C. Jeffries. Jr.. The Right-Remedy 
Gap in Constillltional Law. 109 YALE L.J. 87. 88-89 (1999) (suggesting. among other 
things. that "[T]he only constitutionally mandatory. as distinct from normatively desir-
able. remedial scheme is the right of a target of government prosecution or enforcement 
to defend against that action on the ground that it violates the superior law of the Consti-
tution."). 
22. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe. 536 U.S. 273. 279 (2002) (asserting without elabora-
tion that § 1983 merely creates remedies for federal rights created elsewhere): Albright v. 
Oliver. 510 U.S. 266.271 (1994) (similar): City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle. 471 U.S. 808. 
816 (1985) (similar) (Rehnquist. 1.. plurality opinion): Baker v. McCollan. 443 U.S. 137. 
144 n.3 (1979) (similar): Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org .. 441 U.S. 600. 017 
(1979) (''[O]ne cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of§ 1983' -for§ 1983 by itself 
does not protect anyone against anything."). So too with Bivens. See also Wilkie v. Rob-
bins. 127 S. Ct. 2588. 2597 (2007) (describing Bivens as a mechanism for fashioning a 
"damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation"): Correctional Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko. 534 U.S. 61. 66-70 (2001) (emphasizing the limited remedial purpose of the 
Bivens doctrine). 
23. Civil rights damages claims almost always target individuals because the Su-
preme Court has held that states and their subdivisions are not "persons" subject to suit 
under section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police. 491 U.S. 58. 64 (1989). and 
that sovereign immunity shields the federal government from damages claims under the 
Bivens doctrine. see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer. 510 U.S. 471.485 (1994). Mu-
nicipalities are potentially subject to constitutional damages liability. Monell v. Depart-
ment of Soc. Servs. of City of New York. 436 U.S. 658. 690 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. 
Pape. 365 U.S. 167. 187-91 (1961 ). and holding that municipalities are "persons" subject 
to suit under § 1983). but they are not liable for the conduct of municipal actors under a 
theory of respondeat superior. id. at 691. Rather. municipalities are only subject to sec-
tion 1983 liability when the plaintiffs injuries are caused by municipal "policy or cus-
tom ... id. at 694-95. a concept that has been narrowly defined and is quite difficult to 
prove. see. e.g .. Richard H. Fallon. Jr .. The "Conservative .. Paths of the Rehnquist Court's 
Federalism Decisions. 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429. 463 (2002); Jeffries. supra note 21. at 93. 
As Dean Jeffries has observed. the predominance of "individual capacity" claims in 
constitutional damages actions. and the concomitant freedom from damages liability for-
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~y proceedi~_p down this path, the Court has created a doctrinal 
mcoherence.-
The problem is this: If we are to take seriously the proposi-
tion that, outside of rare situations involving the Thirteenth 
Amendment, only the government (acting, necessarily, through 
living agents) can violate the Constitution,2' the reality of indi-
vidual-capacity damages claims is fundamentally at odds with 
treating section 1983 as merely remedial. Individuals as indi-
viduals lack the legal capacity to violate the Constitution. Only a 
government entity, or an individual serving as an agent of the 
government and therefore acting in a public capacity because the 
individual (1) is employed by the government and has acted 
within the scope of his employment, (2) has exercised a "public 
function," or (3) has received tacit governmental ratification of 
the conduct in circumstances sufficient to warrant application of 
the Supreme Court's state-action "entanglement'' cases, has the 
inherent capacity to infringe constitutional rights. 26 Thus, insofar 
mally enjoyed by government entities other than municipalities. have less practical sig-
nificance than one might think. It is common for the government to insure against the 
costs of defending individual-capacity claims (the defense is typically provided by insur-
ance defense lawyers and not publicly employed lawyers) and to indemnify their employ-
ees against individual-capacity judgments. See Jeffries. supra note 21. at 92-93; see also 
John C. Jeffries. Jr.. In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983. 84 VA. L. 
REV. 47.49-50 (1998). 
24. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
25. See LACRENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN COI"STITUTIONAL LAW.§ 18-1. at 1688 
(2d ed. 1988) ("Nearly all of the Constitution's self-executing. and therefore judicially 
enforceable. guarantees of individual rights shield individuals only from government ac-
tion."): id. at 1688 n.l (recognizing that only "[t]he thirteenth amendment's prohibitions 
of slavery encompass both governmental and private action") (citing The Civil Rights 
Cases. 109 U.S. 3. 20 (1883)): see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co .. Inc .. 500 U.S. 
614. 619 (1991): National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian. 488 U.S. 179. 191 
(1988): Flagg Bros .. Inc .. v. Brooks. 436 U.S. 149. 156 (1978): The Civil Rights Cases. 109 
U.S. at 13-14. 
26. See TRIBE. supra note 25. at 1688-89. In the excellent casebook from which I 
teach. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky calls conduct falling within these "public function" and 
"'entanglement" categories "'exceptions to the state action doctrine." ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY. CO:--ISTITUTIONAL LAW 472 (2d ed. 2005). He also describes these cate-
gories as "'situations where private conduct must comply with the Constitution." /d. I find 
these characterizations of the state-action cases. aptly described by one prominent com-
mentator as "a conceptual disaster area:· Charles L. Black. Jr .. Foreword: "State Action," 
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14. 81 HARV. L. REV. 69. 95 (1967). to 
confuse more than they clarify. The phrase "'exceptions to the state action doctrine" can 
be read to suggest that the Constitution applies even though there is no state action. and 
the term "'private .. invites the reader to regard the conduct in question as not attributable 
to the government. But the state-action cases are better read to hold precisely the oppo-
site: they involve instances in which conduct that might initially be thought to fall beyond 
the Constitution's regulatory compass because it was undertaken by persons who are not 
government employees is nonetheless treated as state action auributable to the government. 
See CHEMERII\;SKY. supra. at 474-518: see also TRIBE. supra note 25. at 1688-91. For 
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as section 1983 creates individual-capacity lawsuits, the statute is 
necessarily substantive. By authorizing causes of action against 
individual persons in their capacities as private jural entities sepa-
rate and apart from their public capacities as agents through 
whom the government acts, section 1983 creates substantive enti-
tlements, and imposes on individual-capacity defendants sub-
stantive duties, that otherwise would not exist. A natural person 
adjudged individually liable under section 1983 for what the Su-
preme Court frequently terms a "constitutional violation" 27 has 
not, in fact, personally "violated" the Constitution. Individual-
capacity liability arises only by virtue of the fact that the per-
sonal defendant has violated a federal statute-one whose sub-
stantive reach is defined by reference to the Constitution but 
which itself creates substantive entitlements and duties insofar as 
it authorizes suits against individuals as individuals for their roles 
in constitutional violations. 
Why does it matter that we resist the tendency to think that 
our constitutional "rights" are enforceable (either defensively, as 
in a motion to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence in a 
criminal case, or offensively, as in a section 1983 action) against 
not only an overreaching government but also against the human 
agents through whom the government acts in their capacities as 
private citizens? Why does it matter that we recognize the sub-
stantive nature of an individual-capacity claim under section 
1983? It matters because, if one accepts that section 1983 creates 
substantive entitlements that otherwise would not exist, and that 
it does not merely specify remedies for substantive rights created 
in the Constitution, there is no longer any reason to presume 
that the substantive entitlements to sue individuals that section 
1983 creates are the same as, or coextensive with, true constitu-
tional rights. And this opens the door to considering whether 
these statutory entitlements might be regarded as narrower than 
true constitutional rights. 
purposes of understanding my argument. it is crucial that readers not misread the state-
action cases to hold that there are categories of cases where entirely ··private·· conduct 
that is not attributable to the government nonetheless can violate the Constitution. 
27. See, e.g .. Hartman v. Moore. 547 U.S. 250. 254 n.2 (2006) ("Bivens established 
that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover 
damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring 
such a right.") (quoting Carlson v. Green. 446 U.S. 14. 18 (1980) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)): Kalina v. Fletcher. 522 U.S. 118. 123 (1997) ("Section 1983 is a codifica-
tion of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The text of the statute purports to create a 
damages remedy against every state official for the violation of any person's federal con-
stitutional or statutory rights.") (footnote omitted). 
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The possibility that the entitlements to sue individuals that 
section 1983 creates might be narrower than true constitutional 
rights is intriguing because, under current law, many infringe-
ments of constitutional rights cannot ground a damages remedy 
under section 1983, notwithstanding the staiute's sweeping and 
unqualified language. 2x While acknowledging that ''[s]ection 1983 
creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no im-
munities," the Supreme Court has "[ n ]one the less ... accorded 
certain government officials either absolute29 or qualified:1{1 im-
munity from suit if the tradition of immunity was so firmly 
rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong 
policy reasons that Congress would have specifically so provided 
had it wished to abolish the doctrine. "'1 Current doctrine thus 
28. See 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 (2000). 
29. The Court has recognized an absolute immunity that protects legislators acting 
in a legislative capacity. Tenney v. Brandhove. 341 U.S. 367.379 (1951). judges acting in a 
judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547. 554-55 (1967). prosecutors acting in a 
prosecutorial capacity. Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409. 417-20 (1976). grand jurors. id. 
at 423 n.20. and witnesses. Briscoe v. LaHue. 460 U.S. 325. 335 (1983). The Court has 
also strongly suggested. although it has never held. that some sort of affirmative .. good-
faith .. defense should be available to individuals who are not government employees but 
who face liability under section 1983 pursuant to the state-action doctrine. See Richard-
son v. McKnight. 521 U.S. 399.413-14 (1997): Wyatt v. Cole. 504 U.S.l58.169 (1992). 
30. The qualified-immunity doctrine shields individual-capacity defendants from 
damages awards under section 1983 and Bivens to the extent that .. their conduct does not 
violate clearly established ... rights of which a reasonable person would have known:· 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800. SIS (1982). Harlow reformulated the qualified-
immunity defense from one requiring both objective reasonableness and subjective good 
faith into a wholly objective inquiry designed to permit claims subject to a qualified-
immunity defense to be resolved as early in the litigation as possible. See id. at 814-18. 
Since Harlow. the Court has continued to emphasize the importance of early resolution 
of any qualified-immunity issues by describing the immunity as one from suit as well as 
liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth. 4 72 U.S. 5!1. 525-27 (1985 ). which .. ordinarily should be 
decided .. long before trial." Hunter v. Bryant. 502 U.S. 224. 228 (1991 ). The Court has 
also treated law-based denials of pretrial motions for dismissal based on an assertion of 
qualified immunity as collateral orders subject to immediate appeal under 2S U.S.C. 
§ 1291 (2006). Mitchell. 472 U.S. at 524-30: see also Johnson v. Jones. 515 U.S. 304. 311-
12 (1995). 
31. Wyatt. 504 U.S. at 163---{;4 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Initially. the Court explained its creation of the immunity doctrines in policy terms 
by emphasizing a need to avoid overdeterring state actors who perform important public 
functions. The Court feared that without an immunity that shields state actors from li-
ability when thev have acted reasonablv. ··executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their ·discretion {n a way injuriously aff~ct[ing] the claims of particular individuals even 
when the public interest require[s] bold and unhesitating action." Nixon v. Fitzgerald. 
457 U.S. 731. 744-45 ( 19S2) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
More recentlv. as Professor Alan Chen has explained. the Supreme Court has 
tended to highlighi the social costs of civil rights litigation in justifying the immunity doc-
trines. See Alan K. Chen. The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 236-
37 (2006 ). Of course. as Professor Chen recognizes, over deterrence and the costs of civil 
rights litigation are closely related phenomena. See also Alan K. Chen. The Burdens of 
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contemplates a two-step inquiry in any individual-capacity dam-
ages claim in which an individual defendant asserts an affirma-
tive immunity defense: First, has the individual defendant com-
mitted a constitutional tort? Second, is the defendant 
nonetheless entitled to avoid liability under the affirmative im-
munity defense asserted?'2 
Part II of this paper argues that the reasons the Supreme 
Court has given for creating non-textual affirmative immunity 
defenses better support a narrower reading of section 1983 that 
would reduce the statutory analysis to a single step, render af-
firmative immunity defenses conceptually unnecessary, and 
eliminate the anomalous subordination of statutory text to con-
trary common law that makes the doctrine governing constitu-
tional tort litigation seem lawless at its most basic level." But 
even if one were to reject the arguments made in Part II, recog-
nition of the fact that an individual-capacity damages claim un-
der section 1983 substantively differs from a true "constitu-
tional" claim permits us to bring a new perspective to a 
controversy that the Supreme Court appears ready to revisit 
when it decides Pearson v. Callahan later this term: whether a 
court entertaining an individual-capacity claim involving an as-
sertion of a qualified-immunity defense should make a prelimi-
nary, law-settling determination whether there has been a consti-
tutional violation before proceeding to the immunity issue.34 
Under current law, the answer is yes. Prompted by concerns 
about law "freezing"- that is, failing to establish what the Con-
stitution requires and thus inviting repeated constitutional viola-
tions without accountability- the Supreme Court in Saucier di-
rected federal courts entertaining individual-capacity damages 
claims to which an affirmative qualified immunity defense is in-
terposed to settle the law by always addressing the constitutional 
issue that is imbedded within the plaintiff's claim before discuss-
ing the defendant's entitlement to immunity." The Saucier rule 
has given rise to a spirited debate about the wisdom of requiring 
such "unnecessary'' constitutional rulings'~> and whether the rul-
Qualified lmmunitv: Summarv Jwlwnent and the Role of Facts in Constitwional Tort 
Law. 47 AM. U. L. REV. I. 24-27 (1997). . 
32. See, e.g .. Brosseau v. Haugen. 543 U.S. 194. 197-9~ (2004). 
33. See infra notes 105-114 and accompanying text. 
34. See supra notes ~-10 and accompanying text. 
35. See Saucier v. Katz. 533 U.S. 194. 201 (2001). receded hv Pearson v. Callahan. 
129 S. Ct. 80~ (2009): see also Greabe. supra note 13. at 408--11 (explaining how the quali-
fied-immunity doctrine can cause law freezing). 
36. The chief critic of the Saucier mandate on the Supreme Court has been Justice 
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ings are barred by the case-or-controversy requirement of Arti-
cle III.'7 
In fact, however, Saucier is flawed in a more fundamental 
respect. The Saucier rule is premised on an assumption that the 
threshold issue raised in any section 1983 individual-capacity 
claim is constitutional. But as explained above, the threshold is-
sue in an individual-capacity claim, properly framed, is not itself 
constitutional: it is whether the defendant has engaged in con-
duct that would constitute a section 1983 violation in the absence 
of any applicable affirmative defense.-'~ True, there is a constitu-
tional issue imbedded within this threshold statutory question. 
And true, if (as current law assumes) the entitlements and duties 
created by section 1983 happen to be the same as, or coextensive 
with. those created by the Constitution-if. in other words, one 
commits a threshold "violation" of section 1983 every time one 
engages in conduct that brings about a deprivation of a right se-
cured by the Constitution-answering the threshold statutory 
question positively would imply that the non-party government 
entity whose power the defendant has employed has violated the 
plaintiff's true constitutional rights. But the threshold statutory 
ruling is not itself "constitutional," the government is not a for-
mal party to s~ch a claim, a~d ~overnment _lawyers typically do 
not defend agamst such a claim. Thus, a ruhng on the Imbedded 
constitutional issue might properly be thought to lack any legal 
significance whatsoever, whatever might be said about its legiti-
Breyer. See Morse v. Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2618. 2638--43 (2007) (Breyer. J .. concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372. 387-89 (2007) 
(Breyer. J.. concurring); Brosseau. 543 U.S. at 201-D2 (Breyer. J .. concurring). But four 
other Justices also have criticized Saucier. See Morse. 127 S. Ct. at 2642 (Breyer. J .. con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (summarizing other Justices· criti-
cisms). So have other federal judges. see id. (summarizing criticisms from lower courts); 
Pierre N. Leva!. Judging Under the Constitllfion: Dicta Abow Dicta. 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1249. 1275 (2006). 
An article by Professor Sam Kamin contains a very nice summary of the academic 
commentarv on this issue. See Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Deci-
sionmaking. in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz. 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 53.55-56 & nn.l6-18 (2008). 
37. Compare Thomas Healy. The Rise of Unnecessary Constillltional Rulings. 83 
N.C. L. REV. 847. 920 (2005) ("Unnecessary constitutional rulings in qualified immu-
nitv ... cases violate the ban on advisory opinions because a decision on the constitu-
tional issue has no effect on the outcome ·of the dispute."). with Kamin. supra note 36. at 
78-97 (rejecting Healy's argument other than in the rare situation in which it is apparent 
from the outset of the case that no remedy will be available to the plaintiff). See also 
Greabe. supra note 13. at 418-26 (rejecting the argument that a bypass of the merits of 
the imbedded constitutional issue is required by Article Ill). 
38. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
39. See supra note 23. 
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macy under Article IIC11 In any event, for the same reasons that 
courts should not entertain constitutional challenges to statutes 
without affording the government notice and an opportunity to 
intervene and defend their legality.~ 1 a court should not issue a 
law-settling ruling about the constitutionality of conduct under-
taken under color of state law-a ruling that could give rise to 
future dam~~es l.iability that ~ill likely be passed along to the 
government-- Without affordmg the government the same op-
• ~1 portumty. · 
What does this mean for the law-freezing debate and Pear-
son v. Callahan? Certainly, it means that. in Pearson, the Su-
preme Court should relax the Saucier rule. which in any event 
went too far in prescribing an inflexible approach to every case.~ 
But the Court also should remain sensitive to the concerns about 
law development that led to the Saucier rule in the first place.~' 
One way to strike a balance would be for the Court to emphasize 
an option available to lower courts faced with individual-
capacity claims to which a qualified-immunity defense is raised: 
if the imbedded constitutional issue is one that should be settled 
for notice-giving reasons, courts can and should invite the rele-
vant government entity to intervene and defend the constitu-
tionality of the challenged conduct.~" In issuing such an invita-
tion, courts might borrow from the procedures outlined in Fed. 
40. Cf 18A CHARLES ALAl' WRIGHT. ARTHuR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER. FEDERAL PRACTICE A:--ID PROCEDCRE. § 4458. at 567 & n.20 (2d ed. 2002) 
("[A] judgment against a government or one government official does not bind a differ-
ent official in subsequent litigation that asserts a personal liability against the offi-
cial .... "): Willner v. Budig. 848 F.2d 1032. 1034 n.2 (lOth Cir. 19RR) ("Government em-
ployees in their individual capacities are not in privity with their government 
employer."): Hurt v. Pullman Inc .. 764 F.2d 1443. 1448 (11th Cir. 191\5) ("Under basic 
principles of res judicata jurisprudence. for a party to be bound by or take advantage of a 
prior suit that party or its privy must not only have been present in both suits. but it has 
to appear in the same capacity in both suits."). 
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5.1: FED. R. APP. P. 44. the requirements of which are sum-
marized infra at note 47: see also 28 U.S.C § 2403 (2000). which authorizes intervention 
by the federal government or the state into any case in which the constitutionality of a 
federal or state statute is questioned but the government is not a party. 
42. See supra note 23. 
43. Certainly. the government's interest in such a ruling is sufficient to authorize 
intervention under FED. R. Clv. P. 24. notwithstanding the fact that an individual-
capacity action challenges only government conduct and not the constitutionality of a 
federal or state statute. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT. ARTHCR R. MILLER & MARY 
KAY KANE. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDL'RE § 1908.2 (3d ed. 2008 Supp.) (recog-
nizing that the stare decisis effect of a judgment is frequently sufficient. by itself. to sup-
port intervention as of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)). 
44. See supra note 13. 
45. For a discussion of these concerns see Greabe. supra note 13. at 426-37. 
46. See supra note 43. 
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R. Civ. P. 5.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 44, which must be followed in 
cases where the government is not a party but the constitutional-
ity of a federal or state statute is called into question.~7 For an 
adverse, law-settling ruling on the constitutional issue imbedded 
within a section 1983 individual-capacity claim can impose costs 
on the government that are similar in nature and scope to those 
which prompted the adoption of these Rules and 28 U.S.C. § 
2403.~x 
II. THE FALSE CONFLICT THAT HAS BEEN 
READ INTO SECTION 1983 INDIVIDUAL-
CAP A CITY CLAIMS 
I turn now to an argument that seeks to capitalize on the 
possibility for doctrinal reform49 created if one accepts that the 
substantive statutory entitlements that section 1983 creates vis-a-
vis individuals need not be the same as, or coextensive with, the 
true constitutional rights which are their referents but not their 
source, and that an individual state actor therefore does not nec-
essarily violate section 1983 every time he or she engages in con-
duct that causes another to suffer an infringement of a constitu-
tional right. As previewed above, my argument is that the 
Supreme Court should adopt a narrower interpretation of the 
cause of action section 1983 creates against individual defen-
dants that would (or at least could) preserve current liability 
47. FED. R. C!v. P. 5.1 requires. inter alia. that a federal district court entertaining a 
lawsuit to which the government is not a party but which challenges the constitutionality 
of a federal or state statute notify the appropriate attorney general of the challenge and 
then permit sixty days for intervention before striking down the statute. Similarly. FED. 
R. APP. P. 44 requires. inter alia. that a federal appeals court entertaining an appeal to 
which the government is not a party but which challenges the constitutionality of a fed-
eral or state statute send notice of the challenge to the appropriate attorney general. 
48. See FED. R. C!V. P. 5.1: FED. R. APP. P. 44: see also 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2000). 
which authorizes intervention by the federal government or the state into any case in 
which the constitutionality of a federal or state statute is questioned but the government 
is not a party. 
49. One judge recently characterized "'[w]ading through the doctrine of qualified 
immunity" as "'one of the most morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appel-
late court judges routinely face ... Charles R. Wilson. "Location, Location, Location": Re-
cent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense. 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445. 
447 (2000): see also McMillian v. Johnson. 101 F.3d 1363. 1366 (11th Cir. 1996) (Propst. 
1 .. concurring specially) (describing keeping up with the law of qualified immunity as a 
full-time job): Flatford v. City of Monroe. 17 F.3d 162. 166 (6th Cir. 1994) ("'[T]he diffi-
culty for all judges with qualified immunity has not been articulation of the rule. but 
rather the application of it."). These quotes are collected in Chen. The Facts About 
Qualified Immunity, supra note 31. at 230 & n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (al-
teration in original). 
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boundaries'0 while doing away with the non-textual, affirmative 
immunity defenses that complicate current doctrine and make 
constitutional tort law seem fundamentally lawless.'! More spe-
cifically, I contend that the reasons the Supreme Court has given 
for reading affirmative immunity defenses into section 1983 bet-
ter support reading the statutory term ·'person"" to exclude 
those defendants presently protected by absolute immunity, and 
the statutory phrase "causes to be subjected"'' to require proof 
that individual-capacity defendants '4 have acted with the same 
negligence with respect to illegality" that now is required to 
overcome an assertion of the qualified-immunity defense.'" 
Below. I argue that such a reinterpretation of section 1983 
could streamline and simplify the resolution of individual-
capacity claims without affecting any substantive entitlements or 
procedural protections that parties enjoy under current law.'7 
But at the outset, I wish to emphasize that my argument is not 
premised on a claim that the proposed approach is compelled by 
the statute's text or history. Rather, I contend only that narrow-
ing the substantive reach of the statute is preferable to the cur-
rent state of affairs as an interpretative matter because it elimi-
nates the present regime's subordination of lawful. 
democratically enacted statutory text to contrary common law. 
The proposal is purely instrumental; it is prompted by a desire to 
more plausibly root constitutional tort law in the positive law 
text that is its source. My hope is that such reform would reduce 
the number of unnecessary and costly disagreements that are 
common in constitutional tort litigation, and that tend to arise 
from judicial adventurism invited by the Supreme Court's many 
50. Whether present liability boundaries should be redrawn is frequently debated. 
see. e.g.. Barbara E. Armacost. Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused. 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 583.587-88 & n.15 (1998) (providing an overview of the critica1literature). but is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Here. I limit my argument to the systemic and conceptual 
benefits that would flow from a clarifving reform of constitutional tort law. 
51. See infra notes 86--88 and ac~o~panying text. 
52. See42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
54. As non-government entities. individual-capacity defendants cannot directly 
··subject"" someone to a constitutional deprivation. but can onlv indirectlv ""cause"" an-
other to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation by misusing the gove;nment power 
they wield. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
55. I follow the lead of Dean Jeffries in using the phrase ··negligence with respect to 
illegality"" as shorthand for the kind of fault required to impose individual-capacity dam-
ages liability under section 1983. See Jeffries. supra note 21. at 90: see also supra note 30. 
56. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text. 
57. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text. 
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indications that the usual rules of statutory interpretation and 
civil trial practice do not apply in this doctrinal area. 
I start with an overview of current law, refracted through 
the lens of section 1983's statutory language, to give readers a 
sense of its mind-numbing and at times illogical complexity. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that there are four types of "per-
son" _subject to suit under section 1983: "official-capacity" per-
sons_,, municipalities,59 individuals employed by the State or one 
of its political subdivisions in their "individual capacities,"h() and 
other private parties who sometimes are said to act "under color 
of' State law. 61 "Official-capacity" defendants may not be sued 
for damages"2 because the State is not a "person" within the 
meaning of section 198363 and a suit for damages against an offi-
cial-capacity defendant is treated as a suit against the State.64 By 
contrast, "official-capacity'' defendants may be sued for injunc-
tive relief because such suits are not treated as suits against the 
State."5 
Although municipalities are political subdivisions of the 
State. they are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.!\6 
Unlike the States, municipalities may be sued for damages under 
section 1983.67 But municipalities are not liable for damages un-
der a theory of respondeat superior; rather, they face damages 
liability only if a municipal "policy or custom" can be said to 
58. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police. 491 U.S. 58. 71 & n.10 (1989) (noting 
that official-capacity persons are subject to suit under section 1983 for equitable relief 
even though the States are not "persons" subject to suit under section 1983 and official-
capacity claims for damages are regarded as de facto claims against the State). I prefer 
the term "public-capacity defendants" to "official-capacity defendants" to account for 
the fact that individuals who are not public officials can be sued in a representational ca-
pacity under the state-action doctrine. For example. there is no reason why a section 1983 
plaintiff could not seek injunctive relief from the warden of a private prison in his or her 
capacity as the holder of an office performing a public function. See. e.g .. Richardson v. 
McKnight. 521 U.S. 399.403-13 (1997). 
59. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of City of New York. 436 U.S. 658. 690 
(1978). 
60. Hafer v. Melo. 502 U.S. 21.25-29 (1991). 
61. Richardson. 521 U.S. at 403. Private state actors may be either individual. see 
id .. or corporate. see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co .. 457 U.S. 922.925 (1982). 
62. Will. 491 U.S. at 71. 
63. /d. at 62-71. 
64. /d. at 71. 
65. /d. at 71 n.lO. The Supreme Court has "explained" this anomaly by saying that 
it is "commonplace in sovereign immunity doctrine:· id. (citation omitted). and that it 
"'would not have been foreign to the 19th-century Congress that enacted § 1983 ... id. ( ci-
tations omitted). 
66. Monell. 436 U.S. at 690 (overruling Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167. 187-91 
(1961)). 
67. /d. 
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have "cause[ d)" the plaintiff "to be subjected" to the deprivation 
of a right secured by the Constitution (or some other federal 
law).o;; Again, it is quite difficult to prove an unlawful custom or 
policy, so most damages claims under section 1983 are brought 
against individual defendants.m 
As explained above, individuals who are employed by a 
State or its subdivisions may be sued for damages.'" but such in-
dividuals are entitled to assert as an affirmative defense either a 
qualified immunity71 or, if they are fulfilling a legislative. judiciaL 
or prosecutorial function, an absolute immunity.'c Private parties 
who are not employed by a State or its subdivisions but who 
nonetheless are accused of unlawfully exercising state power un-
der the state-action doctrine may also be sued for damages."' but 
such persons are not entitled to qualified immunity.'" They may. 
however, be able to assert an affirmative "good faith" defense 
that would substantially overlap with the qualified-immunity de-
fense that state employees are entitled to assert.-' Yet a narrow 
subset of individuals who exercise state power under the state-
action doctrine-witnesses and grand jurors-is entitled to assert 
an absolute immunity defense that shields them from suit and li-
ability.'" 
Once again. the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
none of the affirmative immunity defenses available to individ-
ual defendants facing damages claims is expressly contemplated 
by the text of section 1983, which "on its face admits of no im-
munities."77 But the Court has justified its recognition of these 
immunities by pointing to the fact they existed at common law at 
68. /d. at 694-95. 
69. See supra note 23. 
70. Hafer v. Melo. 502 U.S. 21.25-29 (1991). 
71. See supra note 30. 
72. See supra note 29. 
73. See Wyatt v. Cole. 504 U.S. !SR. 163-69 ( 1992). 
74. See id. 
75. See id. at 16R-69. Justice Scalia has powerfully criticized the different treatment 
accorded prison guards employed by the State and guards at private prisons sued under 
the state-action doctrine with respect to their entitlement to qualified immunity. See 
Richardson v. McKnight. 521 U.S. 399. 422 (1997) (Scalia. 1.. dissenting). My proposed 
reinterpretation of section I 983 would do awav with this differential treatment bv declin-
ing to impose damages liability on any individual who does not act negligently ·with re-
spect to illegality and therefore does not "cause" the plaintiff to suffer a constitutional 
deprivation within the meaning of section I 9R3. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying 
text. 
76. See supra note 29. 
77. Wyall. 504 U.S. at 163 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 L'.S. 409.417 (!97fl)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted): see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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the time of the enactment of section 1983's statutory predeces-
sor, and by concluding that Congress surely would have been 
explicit had it intended to override them. Moreover, the Court 
has stated. these defenses are necessary to ensure fairness to 
those who wield state power, to avoid overdeterring state actors 
as they perform their important public functions, and to keeg in 
check the high social costs generated by civil rights litigation. 
Given the byzantine nature of its ground rules, it will come 
as no surprise that constitutional tort law is beset with disputes 
that devour judicial resources but frequently have little bearing 
on the ultimate liability question that prompted the lawsuit in 
the first place. A partial list of the disagreements that have di-
vided Supreme Court justices and federal appellate judges at-
tempting to administer the constitutional tort regime (some of 
which have been discussed earlier in this paper) includes 
whether courts entertaining individual-capacity actions may and 
should decide the constitutional issues imbedded within individ-
ual-capacity claims under section 1983 in situations where a de-
fendant has a meritorious qualified-immunity defense;7y whether 
"reasonableness" in the qualified-immunity context differs from 
"reasonableness" in the substantive constitutional context pre-
sented in Fourth Amendment cases;"" whether and to what ex-
tent private persons not employed by the government who en-
gage in state action are entitled to assert the qualified-immunity 
defense available to government emplo~ees, a substantively dif-
ferent "good-faith" defense, or neither; 1 whether a heightened-
pleading requirement governs section 1983 claims brought 
against a defendant entitled to assert qualified immunity;"2 
7R See Wyau. 504 U.S. at 163: see also supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
79. Compare Saucier v. Katz. 533 U.S. 194.201 (2001). receded by Pearson v. Calla-
han. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (majority opinion answering this question yes). with Morse v. 
Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2618. 2638-B (2007) (Breyer. L concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the question should be answered no). 
80. Compare Saucier. 533 U.S. at 204 (majority opinion answering this question 
yes). with id. at 209-17 (Ginsburg. L concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the ques-
tion should be answered no). 
81. Compare Richardson v. McKnight. 521 U.S. 399. 404-12 (1997) (majority opin-
ion rejecting claim that private prison guards should be entitled to assert qualified immu-
nitv). with id. at 414-23 (Scalia. L dissenting) (arguing that private prison guards should 
be ·able to assert qualified immunity): Wyatt. 504 U.S. at 163-{)9 (majority opinion reject-
ing claim that private individuals conspiring with state officials should be entitled to as-
sert qualified immunity). with id. at 175-80 (Rehnquist. CL dissenting) (arguing that 
such individuals should be entitled to assert qualified immunity). 
82. Compare Swann v. Southern Health Partners. Inc .. 388 F.3d 834. 837 (11th Cir. 
2004) (indicating that the Eleventh Circuit does impose such a requirement). with Gann 
v. Cline. 519 F.3d 1090. 1092 (lOth Cir. 2008) (stating that the Tenth Circuit does not im-
pose a heightened-pleading requirement in such circumstances). 
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whether denials of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. 50. or 56 motions for 
judgment based on qualified immunity. to the extent that they 
turn on issues of law. may be immediately appealed as "collat-
eral orders" within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291:'' whether the 
qualified-immunity inquiry has two or three "prongs":K-1 and 
whether the jury must resolve factual disputes_ bearing on an in-
dividual defendant's entitlement to immunity.'' 
Yet complexity alone fails to explain the nature, frequency, 
and intensity of the disagreements in this area. The greater prob-
lem is that the Supreme Court has openly acknowledged its will-
ingness to rewrite the text of section 1983 to create a regime that 
"better" balances competing policy considerations than does the 
actual law that Congress passed."" And so we have the Court say-
ing that affirmative immunity defenses drawn from the common 
law need to be read into the statute, even though the statute 
makes no mention of any affirmative defenses and even though 
statutory text usually trumps conflicting common law.'' Even if 
one likes the end result as a policy matter. judicial lawlessness of 
this sort comes at a cost: it suggests that the usual ground rules 
do not apply to constitutional tort law. and it invites ongoing 
tinkering based on nothing more than a judge's subjective sense 
that a better policy balance could be achieved.""' And thus does 
83. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth. 472 U.S. 511. 52-1--30 (1985) (majority opinion 
answering this question yes). with id. at 543-56 (Brennan. J .. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that the question should be answered no). 
84. Compare Higgins v. Penobscot County Sheriffs Dep't. 446 F.3d 11. 13-15 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (majority opinion applying First Circuit"s three-pronged qualified-immunity 
analysis). with id. at 15-17 (Howard. J .. concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the 
First Circuit's three-prong approach to qualified immunity misapprehends the text and 
arguing for a return to the two-prong approach limned in the Supreme Court"s qualified-
immunity cases). 
85. Compare Jennings v. Jones. 499 F.3d 2. 9-10 (1st Cir. 2007) (majority opinion 
strongly suggesting that a factual dispute material to whether a defendant is entitled to 
qualified immunity should be resolved by the jury). with id. at 22 (Lynch. J.. dissenting) 
(suggesting that the trial judge might need to resolve such disputes prior to trial to honor 
a qualifiedly immune defendant"s entitlement to avoid trial as well as liability) (citing 
Kelley v. LaForce. 288 F.3d I. 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
86. See, e.g .. Wyall. 504 U.S. at 163 (acknowledging that the text of section 19S3 
creates no immunities): id. at 165-D6 (acknowledging that Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 
800 (1982) "reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the 
common law") (quoting Anderson v. Creighton. 483 U.S. 635.645 (1987) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)): see also 504 U.S. at 170-71 (Kennedy. J.. concurring) (acknowledg-
ing that the Harlow formulation is without textual or historical roots). 
87. See, e.g.. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan. 451 U.S. 304. 317-19 ( 1981 ). 
SS. Professor Chen provides an excellent account of how the Supreme Court has 
encouraged the lawlessness that permeates this doctrinal area by repeatedly stating that 
qualified immunity is an entitlement to avoid suit as well as liability. by repeatedlv ad-
monishing courts to resolve qualified-immunity issues at the earliest possible stage of the 
litigation. but by failing to explain lum· such early resolutions might he accomplished in 
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the vicious circle continue to turn, burdening the lower federal 
courts with the costly disputes that inevitably follow the objec-
tions from those who challenge the legitimacy of freewheeling 
judicial lawmaking in an area that involves cherished rights and 
is supposed to be governed by the text of a federal statute. 
We can do better than this without altering the liability 
boundaries that the current regime establishes or making it 
harder for a defendant presently entitled to immunity to avoid a 
trial.'" If one accepts that section 1983 is substantive insofar as it 
contemplates individual liability, and that its entitlements to sue 
individuals are not necessarily the same as or coextensive with 
the true constitutional rights from which they are derived, one 
quickly sees that the ''conflict" between statutory text and the 
common law that led the Supreme Court to create section 1983's 
affirmative immunity defenses is entirely avoidable. The com-
mon-law tradition of individual immunity with which the text of 
section 1983 is said to conflict, and that led the Court to read af-
firmative immunity defenses into the statute. can be harmonized 
with the text if it is invoked to explain that Congress almost cer-
tainly would not have regarded the "persons" cloaked with abso-
lute immunity at common law to be ''persons" subject to suit un-
der section 1983."" and almost certainly would not have wanted 
individual defendants who act in an objectively reasonable man-
ner to face damages liability for ''causing'' another to be sub-
jected to the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution. 
Indeed. as the Court has recognized, at least some of the com-
mon-law "defenses" said to underlie today's doctrines were not 
affirmative defenses at all: they were elements of the claim to be 
disproved by the plaintife It thus seems clear that the only rea-
the manv cases where a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity turns on a factual 
dispute that must be resolved by a factfinder. See Chen, The Facrs Abow Qualified Im-
munitL supra note 31. at 233-62. The Court's frequent admonitions without explanation 
have provided the impetus for innovations in the lower federal courts such as the imposi-
tion by judicial fiat of a heightened-pleading requirement applicable to claims subject to 
a qualified-immunity defense. see supra note 82. and speculations about whether the Sev-
enth Amendment jury-trial right attaches to claims to which a qualified-immunity de-
fense has been interposed. see supra note 85. 
i\9. Again. whether altering liability boundaries is desirable is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Sec mpra note 50. 
90. Although section 1983 now purports to impose liability on "[e)very" person 
who engages in the conduct it proscribes. the statute originally referred to "[a)ny'' per-
son. The reviser who prepared the Revised Statutes of 1878 altered the text of the statu-
torv predecessor to section 1983. See Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547.563 (1967) (Douglas. 
J .. dissenting). 
91. For example. at common law. the plaintiff needed to establish that the defen-
dant acted with malice and without probable cause in order to make out a viable mali-
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son for treating these ''immunities" as affirmative defenses in 
conflict with the text of the statute, rather than as grounds for 
considering a narrower reading of the statute, is the assumption 
that section 1983 merely channels substantive rights created in 
the Constitution and therefore is violated by the state's human 
agent every time the state infringes the plaintiff's constitutional 
rights.92 But as argued in Part I, nothing compels this assumption. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already laid the foundation 
for a narrower interpretation of section 1983. Although federal 
judges routinely refer to the absolute immunities that the Court 
has identified as "affirmative defenses,"93 and have stated that 
they are subject to forfeiture under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) if 
they are not pleaded or made the subject of a Rule 12 motion,9~ a 
careful reading of the cases that first recognized these defenses 
strongly suggests that those held to be absolutely immune from 
section 1983 claims-legislators acting in a legislative capacity, 
judges acting in a judicial capacity, prosecutors acting in a prose-
cutorial capacity, grand jurors and witnesses9,-are simply not 
"persons" against whom section 1983 claims can be stated. True, 
the Court has not come right out and said that the term "abso-
lute immunity" is but another way of saying that those who are 
entitled to claim the immunity are not "persons" within the 
meaning of the statute. But it has emphasized that a section 1983 
defendant's entitlement to absolute immunity is a "question of 
cious prosecution or abuse-of-process claim. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 176 n.l (Rehnquist. 
C.J .. dissenting) (stating that it "is something of a misnomer" to describe the common 
law as providing a "defense" to a malicious prosecution or abuse-of-process claim): see 
also id. at 166 n.2 (majority opinion) (accepting Chief Justice Rehnquist's characteriza-
tion of these torts). 
92. When there were subjective elements to the qualified immunity inquiry. there 
also were policy reasons for making qualified immunity an affirmative defense as to 
which the individual defendant bore the burden of proof. See Gomez v. Toledo. 446 U.S. 
635. 640--42 (1980) (explaining that a successful assertion of qualified immunity required 
a defendant to make both objective and subjective showings and noting that the facts as 
to the defendant's subjective state of mind at the time of the incident in question are "pe-
culiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant" and therefore appropriately 
matters as to which the defendant should bear the burden of proof). But with Harlow's 
transformation of qualified immunity into a wholly objective inquiry. see supra note 30. 
this reason for making qualified immunity an affirmative defense has disappeared. 
93. E.g .. San Filippo v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y .. 470 U.S. 1035. 1035 (19R5) 
(White. J.. dissenting from denials of petitions for certiorari): Shmueli v. Citv of New 
York. 424 F.3d 231.236 (2d Cir. 2005): Desi's Pizza. Inc. v. Citv of Wilkes-Barre: 321 F.3d 
411. 428 (3d Cir. 2003 ). . 
94. E.g .. Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov't. 279 F.3d 273. 2R3 
(5th Cir. 2002): see also Chestnut v. City of Lowell. 305 F.3d 18. 22 (lst Cir. 2002) (en 
bane) (Torruella. J.. concurring). 
95. See supra note 29. 
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statutory construction"% that is to be resolved not by giving the 
phrase "[e]very person" a "literal" reading, but rather by giving 
it a reading that is sensitive to the historical context in which the 
statutory predecessor to section 1983 was enacted-a context 
that has been said to require a presumption that Congress would 
not have intended section 1983 to reach those who were not 
amenable to suit at common law.97 By stating that the statutory 
term "[ e ]very person" is not to be given a literal reading, the 
Court more strongly implies that those entitled to absolute im-
munity are not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983 
than that absolute immunity is an affirmative defense to be read 
into the statute.9~ 
The Supreme Court also has read section 1983's "causes to 
be subjected to" language to require a showing of fault. In Mo-
nell v. New York City Department of Social Services,w the Court 
overruled Monroe v. Pape1m and held that municipalities are 
"persons" subject to a damages claim under section 1983 if they 
can be said to have "caused" one to be subjected to the depriva-
tion of a constitutional right. 101 But the Court further held that 
the simple act of delegating municipal power to an official who 
directly "subjects'' another to such a deprivation is insufficient to 
ground a finding of municipal liability under a theory of respon-
deat superior. 102 Rather, what is needed is blameworthy conduct 
on the city's part, such as when a city adopts an unconstitutional 
custom or policy and charges a city official with carrying out that 
custom or policy. 103 In other words. a city does not "cause" one 
to be subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right merely 
by hiring an official who, in his or her official capacity, directly 
96. Briscoe v. LaHue. 460 U.S. 325.326 (1983). 
97. /d. at 330: see also id. at 347-48 (Marshall. J .. dissenting) (framing the issue in 
terms of whether the statutory term "person" includes those who assert an entitlement to 
absolute immunity): Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409.417 (1976) (stating that the argu-
ment in favor of construing the term "[e]very person" to apply "as stringently as it reads" 
has "not prevailed"). 
98. Of course. this reading of the Court's cases also would suggest that absolute 
immunity is not subject to forfeiture pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) if not pleaded 
or made the subject of a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion: rather. it is grounds for an ar-
gument that the plaintiff has not stated a claim on which relief may be granted that can 
be raised prior to or at trial. regardless whether it was raised in the initial response to the 
complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). 
99. 436 u.s. 658 (1978). 
100. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
101. 436 U.S. at 690-91. 
102. /d. at 691. 
103. /d. at 694-95: see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle. 471 U.S. 808. 816-18 
(1985) (Rehnquist. J .. plurality opinion). 
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"subjects" another to a constitutional deprivation. But a city 
does "cause" one to be subjected to such a deprivation when it 
adopts an unconstitutional custom or policy and then confers 
power to carry out that custom or policy on an individual who, in 
an official capacity, directly "subjects" another to a constitu-
tional deprivation. 
As just suggested, Monell is instructive not only on what is 
needed to establish culpable "causation" within the meaning of 
section 1983, but also on what type of statutory "person" can be 
said to directly "subject" another to a constitutional deprivation, 
and what type of "person" merely "causes" another to be sub-
jected to such a deprivation. Monell makes clear that an uncon-
stitutional municipal custom or policy does not itself "subject" 
one to a constitutional deprivation; it only indirectly "causes'' 
one to be subjected to such a deprivation by empowering the 
human agent who, in his or her official capacity, direct!~ "sub-
jects" one to the abridgement of a constitutional right. 1 Simi-
larly, I would submit, because an individual cannot violate any 
provision of the Constitution other than the Thirteenth 
Amendment, an individual acting in one's individual capacity 
does not directly "subject" another person to a constitutional 
deprivation. Rather, an individual acting in an individual capac-
ity merely "causes" one to be subjected to a constitutional depri-
vation by using the power of the office, or otherwise by bringing 
state power to bear, in a way that the Constitution prohibits. 
Thus, while a person can act in both an individual and official 
capacity, a person can only directly "subject" one to a constitu-
tional deprivation in an official capacity-i.e., as a state officer 
or by otherwise being an agent of the State. 
To summarize: When one considers the types of "persons" 
subject to section 1983 liability, the ways in which such persons 
can violate the statute, and the types of remedies section 1983 
authorizes, an interpretation of the statute suggests itself that re-
spects current liability boundaries and remedy limitations, but 
also recognizes the critical differences between and among the 
types of "persons" who can violate section 1983, how they can 
violate the statute, and the types of relief to which they are sub-
ject: 
( 1) An official-capacity defendant is intrinsically govern-
mental and therefore intrinsically capable of directly ''subject-
104. See Monell. 436 U.S. at 692: see also Tuule. 471 U.S. at 818 (Rehnquist. J .. plu-
rality opinion). 
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ing" another to a constitutional deprivation. Such an official 
"person" is strictly liable for a direct constitutional depriva-
tion-otherwise, a plaintiff could not invoke section 1983 to 
secure forward-looking equitable relief, and plaintiffs could 
not recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for litiga-
tion accomplishing reform of this sort- but is subject only to 
equitable relief because the State is not a "person" subject to 
a suit for damages under 1983, and a claim for damages 
brought against an official-capacity person, unlike such a 
claim (or equitable relief, is treated as a suit against the 
State. 100 
(2) An individual-capacity defendant, by contrast, is intrin-
sically non-governmental and therefore intrinsically incapable 
of directly '·subjecting" a person to a constitutional depriva-
tion outside of the Thirteenth Amendment; an individual-
capacity defendant may only indirectly "cause" one to suffer a 
constitutional deprivation by misusing power conferred under 
color of state law. Unlike an official-capacity defendant, an 
individual-capacity defendant who ''causes" such a constitu-
tional deprivation is a "person" subject to the damages rem-
edy that section 1983 explicitly contemplates. But Monell and 
Tuttle make clear that section 1983 "causation" requires more 
than proof of mere causation-in-fact; it requires proximate 
causation in the form of proof of blameworthy conduct on the 
part of the "person" from whom damages are sought.106 
(3) A municipality is a section 1983 "person" that is subject 
to suit in its own name and may be ordered to pay damages, 
but only if it indirectly "causes" a person to be subjected to a 
constitutional deprivation through its own blameworthy con-
duct. Municipalities do not directly "subject" one to a consti-
tutional deprivation; they (like States) act only through hu-
man agents who are the immediate source of any alleged 
constitutional deprivation. 107 
We have already seen how a municipality may incur dam-
ages liability for blameworthy conduct that indirectly "causes" a 
constitutional deprivation: the promulgation of an unconstitu-
tional custom or policy that leads a municipal official directly to 
105. See supra notes 62---{)5 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
107. See Will. 491 U.S. at 71 n.lO (noting that claims for injunctive relief are to be 
brought as official-capacity claims directly against the involved official): Monell. 436 U.S. 
at 692 (treating the offending employee as the one who directly "subjects"' one to a con-
stitutional deprivation); see also Tuttle. 471 U.S. at R18 (Rehnquist. J .. plurality opinion) 
(similar). 
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subject one to a constitutional deprivation. 10' But how may an 
individual-capacity defendant-whether a state employee or an 
individual sued under the state-action doctrine- incur such li-
ability? Again, because Monell holds that section 1983 "causa-
tion" requires a showing of blameworthy conduct as a prerequi-
site to the imposition of a damages remedy, a showing of fault is 
and should be a prerequisite to such liability.10" And what better 
proxy is there for fault on the part of an individual defendant 
than the objectively unreasonable, and therefore objectively 
blameworthy, conduct that must be shown to overcome an asser-
tion of the qualified-immunity defense under current law? 110 
It follows that any viable individual-capacity claim for dam-
ages should be held to require a properly supported allegation 
that the individual acting under color of law "caused" the plain-
tiff to suffer a constitutional deprivation by means of conduct 
that was objectively unreasonable because it was negligent with 
respect to illegality. 111 Under the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 112 this means that a well-
pleaded individual-capacity claim should include sufficient alle-
gations to "show" that the individual defendant, in an individual 
capacity, not only engaged in conduct that resulted in a constitu-
tional deprivation, but also acted in an objectively unreasonable 
manner in light of the reasonably perceived facts as analyzed 
against the backdrop of binding law (which the defendant is 
charged with knowing). 11 ' So too at the summary judgment stage: 
the plaintiff must adduce competent evidence that. if believed by 
the jury, would ground a finding that the individual defendant 
acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in "causinf the 
plaintiff to suffer the deprivation of a constitutional right. 1 ~ Oth-
erwise, an individual-capacity defendant should not have to face 
trial and is entitled to the early dismissal, and trial avoidance, 
108. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
109. See id. 
110. See supra note 30. 
Ill. See id.: see also supra note 55. 
112. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
113. See id. at 554-556. 
114. Because of the tradition of common-law immunity that the Supreme Court has 
cited as one of the primary grounds for recognizing a qualified-immunity defense. section 
1983 would still be regarded as a limited waiver of immunitY under such a construction of 
the statute. Accordingly. denials of dispositive pretrial m~tions brought on the ground 
that the defendant's conduct (as alleged by the plaintiff) was not objectively unreason-
able would still be collateral orders subject to immediate appeal. per 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(2006 ). under the rule adopted in Mitchell v. Forsyth. 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (and refined in 
subsequent cases). See supra note 30. 
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now available under the qualified-immunity defense. But if ma-
terial factual disputes preclude resolution of the case by pretrial 
motion, then so be it. Section 1983 exists, and there is no reason 
to deny Seventh Amendment jury-trial rights to a plaintiff who 
invokes its protections and adduces credible evidence of a con-
stitutional deprivation caused by a defendant unreasonably 
wielding state power. 
To be sure. this narrower construction of section 1983 is not 
perfectly neat and tidy. It may seem weirdly formalistic, and con-
trary to modern legal conventions, to draw such fine distinctions 
between and among the statutory terms "subjects" and "causes 
to be subjected" and actions undertaken by persons in "official" 
or "individual" capacities.' 1' Moreover. it would take some fi-
nessing to harmonize the proposed construction of the statutory 
term "subjects" in section 1983 with the same term as it is used 
in 18 U.S.C. § 242, section 1983's criminal counterpart. 11 " But this 
narrower reading certainly would be more faithful to the text of 
section 1983 than is the present doctrinal regime, and it has the 
additional virtue of being rooted in the Court's absolute immu-
nity cases, Monell, and the plurality opinion in Tuttle. More im-
portantly, it would do away with the non-textual affirmative de-
fenses that unnecessarily complicate constitutional tort law, and 
it would help to clarify that the limited damages liability author-
ized by section 1983 involves no breach of Marbury's promise of 
a remedy for every invasion of a right. 117 The proposed reform 
could thus pave the way for the resolution of constitutional tort 
law claims under ground rules that are at least somewhat more 
intuitive to judges and lawyers than those established by current 
law. And it might forestall the tendency of some judges to pro-
pose additional "refinements" to constitutional tort law-e.g., 
115. Of course. the liberal spirit of modern civil practice would require courts tore-
characterize improperly pleaded claims and defenses to achieve substantial justice in this 
complicated doctrinal area. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (2000) (amended 2007) ("All plead-
ings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."). 
116. Under my proposed interpretation of section 1983, only an official-capacity 
··person" can directly "subject" one to a constitutional deprivation: all other section 1983 
"persons" (i.e .. individuals and municipalities) can only indirectly "'cause" one to be sub-
jected to a constitutional deprivation by misusing government power or, in the case of a 
municipality. giving some human agent the authority to implement an unconstitutional 
custom or policy. But the criminal liability created by 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) attaches 
only to those who "willfully subject[]" one to a constitutional deprivation. and not to 
those who "cause" one to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation. One would have 
to say. then. that section 242 proscribes only conduct willfully undertaken in an official 
capacity. 
117. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
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heightened pleading standards 11x or the suggestion that Seventh 
Amendment jury-trial rights do not attach to claims subject to a 
qualified immunity defense 114 - based on nothing more than a 
notion that such refinements would better serve public policy. 
Lawlessness begets more lawlessness, and it is well past time to 
do away with the lawlessness that permeates constitutional tort 
law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
To succeed in law school, students must learn to regard with 
skepticism their intuitive reactions to legal problems. Early in 
their careers, students are ~dvised against assumi~~ that the 
moral answer to a problem 1s also the legal answer, - and they 
are warned that the law will depart from the dictates of logic and 
history when practical considerations so require. 121 If all goes 
well, students quickly internalize these lessons and learn to 
check any tendency to assume that people must honor their con-
tractual commitments or rescue a drowning child. So too do they 
come to understand that legal progress is frequently achieved 
through facile treatments of precedent, willful blindness to logi-
cal inconsistencies, and even out-and-out dishonesty. And thus 
do law students learn to "think like lawyers." 
But e':en if ·'~t]he lif~ of the law has no.t been logic: it has 
been expenence," --there 1s usually room for Improvement when 
legal doctrine carves completely unpredictable paths and the or-
dinary operational principles of law do not apply. When legal 
doctrine is not intuitive or predictable to seasoned judges and 
lawyers, it becomes costlier to administer. Those who must con-
form their conduct to the law find it difficult to anticipate the li-
ability boundaries that courts will enforce, lawyers more fre-
quently make mistakes, the courts are more frequently called on 
to sort things out, disagreements among judges become more 
common, and lawless judicial adventurism ensues. 
Such is the case with constitutional tort doctrine, and at 
least some of the problem lies in the fact judges have failed to 
118. See supra note 82. 
119. See supra note 85. 
120. See, e.g.. Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Parh of rhe Law. 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897). reprinred in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991.992-97 ( 19Y7). 
121. See id. c.t 998-1001: see genera/lv BE~JAMIN N. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921 ). 
122. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. JR .. THE COMMON LAW I (1881). 
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appreciate the substantive nature of section 1983 insofar as it au-
thorizes causes of action against individuals for their roles in 
constitutional deprivations. By recognizing the substance of sec-
tion 1983, the Supreme Court could open a door to much-
needed doctrinal reform that would help to restore a sense of 
predictability and lawfulness to this important area of the law. 
